Strategy research on variable load carbon price and demand response of integrated energy system based on Stackelberg game and cooperative game

Xiaoou Liu

Energy, 2025, vol. 328, issue C

Abstract: At present, ignoring the carbon emission responsibility of load side has led to a poor effect of optimization operation for low-carbon integrated energy system (IES). In response to the above issues, this paper conducted strategy research on variable load carbon price and demand response of low-carbon IES based on Stackelberg game and cooperative game. Firstly, an accurate description was given of the interest interactions between integrated energy system operator (IESO) and load aggregator (LA) involved in energy market and carbon emission trading market, as well as among users within LA during the power exchange process. The realization path of low-carbon economic dispatch for IES from both the source and load sides was explored. Then, a model of Stackelberg game between IESO and LA was established, aiming at realizing a low-carbon optimization operation. The upper-level IESO formulates a variable load carbon price based on the carbon emission flow (CEF) model. The lower-level LA makes demand response according to energy price and load carbon price. Based on Nash bargaining theory, a model of cooperative game is built to minimize the total cost of LA and realize rational distribution of cooperation benefits among users. The concept of shared energy storage is introduced to further reduce the total cost of LA. In response to the above-mentioned problem of Stackelberg game and cooperative game, the rime optimization algorithm (RIME) is utilized to achieve high-precision and fast solution of the Stackelberg game model, and the adaptive alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is adopted to solve the distributed optimization problem of cooperative game among users within LA. Finally, relying on the clean and low-carbon demonstration zone of Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City in China, it has been proven that the strategy proposed in this paper can achieve energy saving and emission reduction of IES from both source and load sides, and can improve the game solution between IESO and LA, as well as among users within LA.

Keywords: Integrated energy system; Carbon emission flow; Load carbon price; Shared energy storage; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:energy:v:328:y:2025:i:c:s0360544225022212

DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.136579

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