Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game

Tomoya Tajika

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 123, issue C, 228-239

Abstract: Dynamic public good contribution games in the literature allow players to contribute in multiple periods. These games typically have inefficient and, sometimes, (approximately) efficient subgame perfect equilibria. Inefficiency can take the form of either delayed provision or nonprovision of the public good. In contrast, this paper studies a game that differs primarily in that each player can contribute only once. Each player thus chooses the period at which they contribute, and the size of the contribution. The main result is that if the number of periods is finite but larger than the number of players, then every subgame perfect equilibrium in which each player's contribution amount is strictly less than that player's valuation for the good is efficient: the public good is provided without delay.

Keywords: Dynamic contribution game; Contribute once; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:228-239

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011

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