Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld and Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 152, issue C, 276-292

Abstract: We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce “social” goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results show that social-good production more than doubles if incentives are low, but only if self-selection is possible. The analysis identifies a crucial role of incentives in the matching and coordination of motivated agents.

Keywords: Intrinsic motivation; Self-selection; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D90 J24 J31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:276-292

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.010

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