Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

Eduardo Azevedo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 83, issue C, 207-223

Abstract: This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I use the Azevedo and Leshno (2013) framework, in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers.

Keywords: Matching markets; Imperfect competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:207-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.009

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