The role of antitrust policy on the composition of mergers: Further reflections on “stealth consolidation”

John W. Mayo and Robert Press

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2025, vol. 101, issue C

Abstract: Did a 2000 legislatively-mandated increase in the reporting thresholds for proposed mergers lead firms to endogenously undertake mergers that now lie below the threshold, with the aim of avoiding regulatory scrutiny? Recent research finds support for this behavior, dubbing this activity “stealth consolidation.” We extend this exploration in new directions logically implied by the theory. Our empirical findings are inconsistent with the theory of stealth consolidations, and suggest that more research is necessary to explain the evolving composition of mergers.

Keywords: Mergers; Stealth consolidation; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:101:y:2025:i:c:s0167718725000281

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103162

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