Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices

Simon Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Martin Peitz

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, vol. 30, issue 3, 321-325

Abstract: Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.

Keywords: Media economics; Pricing ads; Advertising clutter; Information congestion; Mergers; Entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Media Market Concentration, Advertising Levels, and Ad Prices (2011)
Working Paper: Media market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:3:p:321-325

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.11.003

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