Behavior-based price discrimination and customer information sharing

Romain De Nijs

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 50, issue C, 319-334

Abstract: This article investigates the incentives and effects of rival firms sharing their customers’ identities, using a two-period model with behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). A unilateral information exchange between the two periods takes place in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. This exchange increases the ability of the firms to discriminate prices amongst consumers according to their profiles, and boosts the profitability of BBPD at the customers’ expense.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Dynamic pricing; Privacy; Information sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:319-334

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.12.003

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