The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel

Douglas Turner

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2024, vol. 97, issue C

Abstract: I analyze pricing behavior before and after the detection of an air cargo cartel using a novel, hand-collected dataset. I find that prices did not decline after the cartel's detection. Additionally, pricing patterns are consistent with post-cartel tacit collusion. My findings suggest that airlines' cartel activity (specifically, the development of a methodology for determining the collusive price) laid a foundation for future tacit collusion. As a result, airlines profited from cartel activity, and shippers paid elevated prices, long after the cartel's dissolution.

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:97:y:2024:i:c:s016771872400064x

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103109

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