Liability of not being known: CEO media visibility and acquisition timing in acquisition waves

Russell Fralich, Alireza Ahmadsimab and Marie-Ann Betschinger

Journal of Business Research, 2025, vol. 200, issue C

Abstract: We examine the role of CEO media visibility on the timing of the CEO firm’s acquisitions in a merger wave. We propose that when CEOs are more visible in the media, their capability to acquire increases while their motivation to acquire decreases. Using a sample of U.S.-based acquisitions between 2000 and 2018, we show that less visible CEOs delay merger wave entry, but that CEOs already in the media spotlight also tend to delay, albeit for different reasons. High CEO financial incentives moderate this relationship to encourage earlier wave entry. A CEOs’ performance track record also moderates this relationship such that low visibility CEOs with good past performance tend to join earlier. Our findings contribute to our understanding of CEO factors affecting the timing of acquisitions.

Keywords: CEO; Merger wave; Timing; Acquisition; Media; Visibility; First mover; Second mover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:200:y:2025:i:c:s0148296325004333

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2025.115610

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