EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Yardstick competition and partial coordination: Exploring the empirical distribution of local business tax rates

Thiess Buettner and Axel von Schwerin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thiess Büttner

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 124, issue C, 178-201

Abstract: This paper explores a striking form of tax policy interdependence that can be observed in the German federation. Though municipalities enjoy discretion in setting the local business tax rate, large fractions of municipalities – in some states even the majority – set identical tax rates. Our analysis shows that this tax-rate “bunching” is not the result of federal or state-level institutions. Possible explanations rest on partial coordination and yardstick competition. The role of the former is exemplified by the finding that small jurisdictions and jurisdictions sharing the same county are more likely to engage in “bunching”. Yardstick competition seems also relevant since jurisdictions for which strategic tax-setting should be associated with larger gains and lower cost are in fact more likely to set identical tax rates.

Keywords: Local business tax; Tax competition; Yardstick competition; Partial tax coordination; Location; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268115002802
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:178-201

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.013

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:178-201