Inequality, social mobility and redistributive preferences

Isabel Günther and Bruno Martorano ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 229, issue C

Abstract: In an online experiment, we provide US citizens with information on both inequality of outcomes and opportunities and test the impact on preferences for redistribution. Information on wealth inequalities in the US increases consensus on a more progressive tax system, whereas information on lack of social mobility in the US increases participants’ preferences for redistribution via fiscal spending. Both informational treatments have a stronger impact when participants also learn that higher inequality is not a necessary part of economic development. All informational treatments have a stronger impact for citizens who underestimate the current level of inequality, trust the government, or belong to the middle-income group, while there is no clear relationship between political position and the impact of information on preferences for redistribution.

Keywords: Inequality; Social mobility; Preferences for redistribution; Online experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D63 D90 H20 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Inequality, social mobility and redistributive preferences (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:229:y:2025:i:c:s0167268124004426

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106828

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