 Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpectedLinda Dezső, Gergely Hajdu and Yossef Tobol Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, vol. 232, issue C Abstract: Results of two studies demonstrate that long and unexpected waits adversely shape moral behavior. In Study 1, passengers who had just joined the check-in line at Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in, and then their actual wait duration was recorded. After checking in, they privately rolled a die, reported an outcome while knowing that higher reports yield higher earnings. We found that wait duration is positively associated with lying. Study 2 (laboratory experiment) exogenized the duration of waits (long versus short) and whether those durations were known (expected) or unknown (unexpected) to subjects in advance. We find that long waits cause, on average, more lying than short waits, and that average lying is the highest for long and unexpected waits. We propose that after long and unexpected waits, people may seek compensation in the monetary domain via relaxed morals. Keywords: Framed field experiment; Die-under-cup task; Lying; Expectations; Compensation-seeking; Waiting; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:232:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125000599 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106939 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D. More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier |
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