Carbon pricing, compensation, and competitiveness: Lessons from UK manufacturing
Piero Basaglia,
Elisabeth T. Isaksen and
Misato Sato
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2025, vol. 133, issue C
Abstract:
Carbon pricing is often paired with compensation to carbon-intensive firms to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage. This paper empirically examines the effects of indirect carbon cost compensation on UK manufacturing firms. Using administrative microdata, we combine difference-in-differences and fuzzy regression discontinuity designs to exploit firm-level eligibility criteria and identify the causal impact of compensation. We find that compensation reduces output contraction but also increases electricity consumption and emissions. These findings highlight a key policy trade-off – while compensation can help protect firms’ competitiveness and reduce leakage risks, it may also delay industrial decarbonization and increase the overall cost of achieving national emission targets.
Keywords: Carbon pricing; Compensation; Competitiveness; Electricity consumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 Q4 Q41 Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:133:y:2025:i:c:s0095069625000920
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103208
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