 Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum gameJournal of Economic Psychology, 2012, vol. 33, issue 3, 425-434 Abstract: Pre-play face-to-face communication is known to facilitate cooperation. Various explanations exist for this effect, varying in their dependence on the strategic content of the communication. Previous studies have found similar communication effects regardless of whether strategic communication is available. These results were so far taken to support a social-preferences based explanation of the communication effects. The current experiment provides a replication and extension of previous results to show that different processes come into play, depending on the communication protocol. Specifically, pre-play communication in an ultimatum game was either restricted to non-game-related content or unrestricted. The results show that strategic, but not social, communication affects responders’ strategies. Thus, the existing results are cast in a new light. I conclude that pre-play communication effects may be mediated by qualitatively different processes, depending on the social context. Keywords: Pre-play communication; Bargaining; Ultimatum game; Video experiment social norms; Social preferences; Interpersonal communication (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:425-434 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.009 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier |
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