On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world: Evidence from differential enforcement

Rita Almeida () and Reyes Aterido

Labour Economics, 2011, vol. 18, issue S1, S71-S82

Abstract: This paper analyzes the causal effect between strict employment protection regulations and the firm incentive to invest in job training of their employees. We explore a large firm level data set across several developing countries and assume that the rigidity of labor regulations affects more the investment decision of firms that faces a rigid enforcement of labor regulations. Our findings show that differences across countries in the enforcement of more rigid employment protection regulation are associated with very small differences in the investment in job training across firms. This finding is robust across several specifications and samples.

Keywords: On-the-job training; Employment protection; Enforcement regulations; Firm level data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 K31 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:18:y:2011:i:s1:p:s71-s82

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2011.05.001

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