Pareto improving taxes

John Geanakoplos and H.M. Polemarchakis

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, vol. 44, issue 7-8, 682-696

Abstract: We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities. It shows that policy makers should look for good tax packages that help everybody, rather than thinking taxes must inevitably be bad for some lobby that will oppose them.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Pareto Improving Taxes (2008)
Working Paper: Pareto Improving Taxes (2006)
Working Paper: Pareto Improving Taxes (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:7-8:p:682-696

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