Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium

Joseph Ostroy and Joon Song

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, issue 12, 869-879

Abstract: The play of a game is a public good because it is "consumed" by each of the players. We model the play as supplied by an organizer managing a team--the demanders of the public good whose actions are unobservable. Competition among organizers leads to a price-quantity description of efficient correlated equilibria, called incentive compatible Lindahl equilibria. Conjugate duality characterizations of the sets of (i) (non-incentive compatible) Lindahl equilibria for games in normal form, (ii) correlated equilibria, and (iii) incentive compatible Lindahl equilibria are compared.

Keywords: Correlated; equilibrium; Lindahl; equilibrium; Conjugate; duality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:12:p:869-879

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