The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players

Youcef Askoura

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 43-47

Abstract: Abstract This paper deals with the weak-core of normal form games with a continuum set of players and without side payments. This concept is an approximation of the core introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. The weak-core is slightly larger than Aumann's [alpha]-core when adapted to large anonymous games. A non-emptiness result is obtained based on the well known Scarf's non-vacuity theorem for finite games.

Keywords: Weak-core; [alpha]-core; Game; with; a; continuum; of; players; Large; anonymous; games; Normal; form; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-4068(10)00138-2
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:43-47

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().