Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

Olivier Bos

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012, vol. 48, issue 2, 83-91

Abstract: We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the linkage principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.

Keywords: All-pay auction; War of attrition; Number of bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (2012)
Working Paper: Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:2:p:83-91

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.12.002

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