Wealth taxation and life expectancy
Antonio Andrés Bellofatto
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2025, vol. 152, issue C
Abstract:
This paper studies the role of wealth taxes in providing insurance against lifespan risk through the lens of a dynamic Mirrlees model with altruism. I derive novel formulas linking optimal taxes on savings and bequests to the degree of annuity market imperfections at the optimum. In the presence of positive correlation between productivity and life expectancy, optimal annuity markups are positive in expectation. This creates a motive not only for taxing savings but also for subsidizing bequests. When calibrating the model, I find that the forces of differential longevity lead to optimal wealth taxes commensurate with prevailing wealth tax rates in developed countries. Relative to the US status quo, optimal policies provide work incentives by increasing welfare of the short-lived at the bottom of the skill distribution. This channel generates significant welfare gains. Replacing the optimal annuity markup by a nonlinear history-independent approximation generates small efficiency losses.
Keywords: Optimal taxation; Savings and bequests; Differential longevity; Annuities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H21 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393225000522
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:152:y:2025:i:c:s0304393225000522
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103781
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Monetary Economics is currently edited by R. G. King and C. I. Plosser
More articles in Journal of Monetary Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().