Signals from the government: Policy disagreement and the transmission of fiscal shocks

Giovanni Ricco (), Giovanni Callegari and Jacopo Cimadomo

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2016, vol. 82, issue C, 107-118

Abstract: We investigate the effects of fiscal policy communication on the propagation of government spending shocks. To this aim, we propose a new index measuring the coordination effects of policy communication on private agents׳ expectations. This index is based on the disagreement amongst US professional forecasters about future government spending. The underlying intuition is that a clear fiscal policy communication can coalesce expectations, reducing disagreement. Results indicate that, in times of low disagreement, the output response to fiscal spending innovations is positive and large, mainly due to private investment response. Conversely, periods of elevated disagreement are characterised by muted output response.

Keywords: Disagreement; Government spending shock; Fiscal transmission mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

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Working Paper: Signals from the government: policy disagreement and the transmission of fiscal shocks (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:moneco:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:107-118

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.07.004

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