Evolution of public cooperation with weighted and conditional strategies

Xuwen Wang, Haifeng Zhang, Sen Nie and Binghong Wang

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2013, vol. 392, issue 19, 4668-4674

Abstract: In real systems, generous individuals who prefer to contribute can play more important roles on the public than selfish individuals. Inspired by this, a spatial public goods game with weighted and conditional strategies is proposed in this paper. In our model, a player’s contribution behavior is mainly determined by the less cautious neighbors rather than those more cautious ones. The weight effect is adjusted by a non-negative parameter α. Our results show that the number of strategies increases with the weight parameter α for the low multiplication factor r. On the contrary, for the high multiplication factor r, the less cautious cooperators are more likely to appear in the system.

Keywords: Spatial public goods game; Weighted and conditional strategy; Cooperation level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437113004433
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:392:y:2013:i:19:p:4668-4674

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2013.05.020

Access Statistics for this article

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications is currently edited by K. A. Dawson, J. O. Indekeu, H.E. Stanley and C. Tsallis

More articles in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().