Cooperation enhanced by habitat destruction in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Xiqing Yang,
Wanxiong Wang,
Feng Zhang and
Hongqiang Qiao
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2017, vol. 486, issue C, 668-673
Abstract:
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a fundamental problem within groups of selfish individuals, whereby we introduce a model of replicator equations based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In the present work, the effect of habitat destruction on the evolution of cooperation will be taken into account. Our results show that cooperators can receive the biggest boost for a moderate value of habitat destruction, and more serious habitat destruction will lead to lower levels of cooperation until zero. Moreover, we also reach the conclusion that the cooperation level decreases monotonously with the increasing of the ratio of cooperative cost to benefit but increases monotonously with the increasing of the encounter probability. Our findings can help to further understand the evolution of cooperation under the harsh external environment.
Keywords: Cooperation; Replicator equations; Evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:486:y:2017:i:c:p:668-673
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.05.087
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