Case preparation investments in the presence of costly judicial attention

Brishti Guha

Research in Economics, 2024, vol. 78, issue 2

Abstract: This is the first paper I am aware of to integrate litigants’ investment in pretrial case preparation with the fact that judges experience small costs to processing extra information conveyed by litigants. While a full-scale battle involving high case preparation by both parties would have obtained if litigants were confident that judges would review the extra evidence, costly judicial attention results either in an equilibrium where no one incurs case preparation expenses, or (if parties are relatively malicious, and judicial technology is efficient) in just one litigant, but not both, incurring such expenses. The latter possibility can create incentives for a signaling race. While costly judicial attention lowers case preparation expenses and generally makes litigants better off relative to the full attention case, it can also lead to fewer cases being immediately settled.

Keywords: Costly attention; Litigation; Case preparation; Malice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D91 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:78:y:2024:i:2:s1090944324000218

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.100957

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