Rookie independent directors and corporate ESG Performance: Evidence from China
Yiling Zhang and
Dandan Li
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2025, vol. 103, issue C
Abstract:
This study deeply analyzes the association between rookie independent directors and corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022. Subgroup analyses across industries and regions show that higher proportions of rookie independent directors reduce ESG performance through the increase of agency costs, particularly in competitive, heavily polluting and eastern-region firms. The study finds that negative impacts can be effectively mitigated by increasing the ownership concentration of controlling shareholders, enhancing information transparency, and raising the proportions of rookie independent directors with overseas experience, financial expertise, and Communist Party membership within the group.This study contributes to the literature on rookie independent directors by considering non-financial dimensions and provides empirical insights for optimizing board structures and promoting sustainable development.
Keywords: Rookie independent director; ESG performance; Agency cost; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:103:y:2025:i:c:s1059056025005957
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.104432
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