Why Institutions Endure: Norms, Leadership, and What Enables Reform
Omer Majeed
CAMA Working Papers from Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University
Abstract:
Why do trapped countries remain locked in bad institutions while a few escape? This paper introduces a novel framework in which societal norms and leadership traits drive institutional persistence and change. It offers four insights. First, leadership traits correlate with societal norms through contagion, incentives, selection pool effects, and normative alignment - cross-country tests are consistent with this framework. Second, it explains why sustainable reforms are rare. Third, it shows reforms endure only when norms shift and explains the mechanism. Fourth, in notable transformations - Singapore, South Korea, Botswana, and Turkiye - it shows enduring reforms require both duration and intensity.
Keywords: Institutions; societal norms; development; leadership; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D73 E02 H83 O43 O57 Z10 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2025-06, Revised 2025-08
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https://crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/20 ... d%20Aug%202025_2.pdf Revised Version (application/pdf)
https://crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/20 ... al%20June%202025.pdf Original Version (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:camaaa:2025-36
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