Financial markets where traders neglect the informational content of prices
Erik Eyster,
Matthew Rabin and
Dimitri Vayanos
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when investing in a risky asset, failing to fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising cursed traders generate more trade than those comprising rationals; mixed markets can generate even more trade because rationals exploit return predictability caused by cursed. Per-trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others' information from prices but dismiss it as noisier than their own. Public-information revelation raises rational and"dismissive" volume, but lowers cursed volume given moderate non-informational trading motives.
JEL-codes: D82 G00 G11 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2017-08-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118956/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Financial Markets Where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices (2019) 
Working Paper: Financial markets where traders neglect the informational content of prices (2019) 
Working Paper: Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices (2015) 
Working Paper: Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices (2015) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:118956
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().