Beat 'em or join 'em: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets

J. Peter Neary and Paul O'Sullivan

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other''s R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.

JEL-codes: L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20247/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1999)
Working Paper: Beat Em or Join Em: Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat'Em Or Join'Em? Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'em or join 'em?: export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets (1998)
Working Paper: Beat 'em or Join 'em?: Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:20247

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().