The political role of the state in Cambridge Theories of growth and distribution

Sébastien Charles ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2007, vol. 27, issue 4, 567-574

Abstract: In this paper we extend Kaldor’s Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem. JEL Classification: E12, E21, E61.

Keywords: Kaldor; Budgetary policy; Distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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