Judiciary and regulatory policy

Rafael Silveira e Silva () and Álvaro P. S. Costa Júnior ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 31, issue 4, 659-678

Abstract: Increasingly, judges and the courts appear as actors capable of affecting the trajectory of the government decisions, as strategic agents in the policy process. This paper presents an analytical model able to clearly and objectively measure the impact of judicial review in the design of policies in the sphere of economic regulation. Underlying the model is the concept of transaction costs, through which one can raise the levels of intervention of the judiciary in regulatory policy. In addition to the analytical model, the article demonstrates that the interaction between the heterogeneity of preferences in the courts and institutional mechanisms of the justice system is capable of generating greater coordination and cooperation than expected. JEL Classification: K12; K23; K41; P46.

Keywords: Judiciary; regulatory policy; judicialization; transaction costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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