Social control of public expenditures in a multilevel principal–agent approach

Valdemir Pires () and André Sathler Guimarães ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 878-894

Abstract: This study enhances the principal–agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptive-exemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal–agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal–agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control. JEL Classification: H11.

Keywords: public management; principal-agent model; public expenditure social control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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