The nature of Central Bank Independence: historical background and rise in the era of financialization

Rodrigo Siqueira Rodriguez ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 44, issue 3, 583-599

Abstract: This article brings back the debate on central bank independence from its historicalorigins and its relation to financialization. With financial dominance, States have less influenceover central bank policies as they gain greater action capacity through monetary policystrengthening. Central bank independence is an expression of financialization as it makesthe monetary authority more susceptible to financial market pressures and simultaneouslylimits the participation of the State and society in conducting monetary policy. JEL Classification: E58; B26.

Keywords: Central bank independence; financialization; rentier accumulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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