Cooperation and Effort, Reciprocity and Mutual Supervision in Worker Cooperatives

Roger McCain

A chapter in Cooperative Firms in Global Markets, 2007, pp 185-203 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: This paper formalizes the determination of effort in work teams as a social dilemma, adding a mutual-monitoring activity and reciprocity motivations to the formal model of effort provision in cooperatives. It turns out that the cooperative solution is viable in a work group in which the workers frame effort as a reciprocal gift, and if they do frame effort in this way in worker cooperatives, this could explain the observed tendency of cooperatives to attain higher productivity.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:aeapzz:s0885-3339(06)10007-1

DOI: 10.1016/S0885-3339(06)10007-1

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