An agency theory approach towards bribery

Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2019, vol. 27, issue 2, 160-168

Abstract: Purpose - This paper aims to discuss the role of agency theory in combatting bribery in multinational corporations. It is shown how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to create the right incentives for agency. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the analysis of 15 formal and 15 informal expert interviews with both prevention experts and corrupt individuals, concrete ways of more effectively combatting bribery have been developed. Findings - As a result, it is suggested that matrix systems could help to adjust incentives systems to take compliance issues into account. It is found that multinational corporations should eliminate. Research limitations/implications - This study’s findings are limited to the perspectives of 30 interviewees. Hence, it is possible that a study with a larger sample conducted in different countries or at a different time would have led to different results. Practical implications - The identification of the potential role of incentive systems in compliance mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers and legislators with valuable insights into why the current prevention schemes are ineffective. This can help to both improve compliance mechanisms. Originality/value - While the empirical findings are based in Europe, the results could be applied globally.

Keywords: Corruption; Incentives; Bribery; Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:jfrc-03-2018-0041

DOI: 10.1108/JFRC-03-2018-0041

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance is currently edited by Prof John Ashton

More articles in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().