Institutional pressures and risk governance: testing the mediation role of collectivist orientation among financial institutions in Uganda

JohnBosco Kakooza, Vicent Bagire, Ernest Abaho, John Munene and Sulait Tumwine

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2024, vol. 32, issue 3, 403-419

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the relationship between institutional pressures and risk governance in financial institutions (FIs) in Uganda and to establish mediational role of collectivist orientation in the relationship between institutional pressures and risk governance in financial institutions in Uganda. Design/methodology/approach - The study adopts a cross-sectional and quantitative research design. The authors employed Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling (SmartPLS 3.3.0 for professionals) to test hypotheses. Findings - The results indicate that institutional pressures is significantly associated with risk governance in FIs. The study also finds collectivist orientation partially mediates the relationship between institutional pressures and risk governance in FIs in Uganda. Originality/value - To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study provides initial empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional pressures, collectivist orientation and risk governance using evidence from a developing African country – Uganda. Additionally, this study provides an initial evidence of the mediating role of collectivist orientation in the relationship between institutional pressures and risk governance in FIs.

Keywords: Institutional pressures; Risk governance; Collectivist orientation; Financial institutions; Institutional theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:jfrc-12-2023-0190

DOI: 10.1108/JFRC-12-2023-0190

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