Learning Foundations and Complexity of the Cursed Equilibrium

Topi Miettinen

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium.

Keywords: Analogy Expectations; Bounded Rationality; Curse; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2007-11
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