Power Asymmetry in Repeated Play of Provision and Appropriation Games

James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj and James Walker

No 2022-04, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of power asymmetry on resolution of social dilemmas in repeated play of linear public good games. The experiment uses a 2X2 design that crosses power symmetry or asymmetry in games with positive (provision) or negative (appropriation) externalities. Our data suggest that power asymmetry has a detrimental effect on voluntary allocations to a public good, with the effect being more pronounced in the asymmetric-power appropriation game. Allocations to a public good increase with "social" income, which is inconsistent with allocations by different individuals being strategic substitutes. With power asymmetry, second movers earn more than first movers in the appropriation game but not in the provision game.

JEL-codes: C52 C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2022-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Power asymmetry in repeated play of provision and appropriation games (2024)
Working Paper: Power Asymmetry in Repeated Play of Provision and Appropriation Games (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2022-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by J. Todd Swarthout ().