Do Water Audits Work?
Jesper Akesson,
Robert Hahn,
Rajat Kochhar and
Robert Metcalfe
Natural Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website
Abstract:
Water suppliers are showing greater interest in using different mechanisms to promote conservation. One such mechanism is conducting home water audits, which involves assessing water use and providing tailored suggestions for conserving water for residential customers. Yet, very little is known about the economic impacts of these water audits. This paper helps fill this gap by implementing a natural field experiment in the United Kingdom. The experiment randomly allocates 45,000 water customers to a control group or to treatment groups that receive different behavioral encouragements to take-up an online water audit. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, encouraging subjects to participate in an audit with financial incentives reduces household consumption by about 17 percent over two months. Furthermore, we find that the size of the financial incentive used to encourage conservation matters for take-up, but not conservation. Second, although there are substantial improvements in water conservation for some interventions, they do not appear to yield net benefits of more than 1 pound per person under various sensitivity analyses. We also implement a marginal value of public funds approach that considers benefits and costs and reach a similar conclusion. Third, we find that targeting high users could double the effectiveness of the financial incentive interventions.
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:natura:00820
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