Empirical evidence on vertical foreclosure

James W. Meehan and Eric Rosengren ()

No 93-4, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Abstract: Recent papers have shown conditions under which vertical, mergers can result in anticompetitive foreclosure of unintegrated rivals. These models imply that a necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive foreclosure is that unintegrated rivals are less profitable after a vertical merger. We test this hypothesis by examining the stock prices of unintegrated rivals at the time of a vertical merger announcement and at the time of a government antitrust complaint. We find no evidence to support the foreclosure hypothesis.

Keywords: Consolidation; and; merger; of; corporations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economic Inquiry 32, no. 2 (April 1994): 303-17.

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Journal Article: Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure (1994)
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