Some observations on central bank accountability

W. Lee Hoskins

Economic Commentary, 1991, issue Oct

Abstract: An analysis of the institutional design of the Federal Reserve System, stating that the central bank should be given a clear legislative mandate to achieve price-level stability and financial market efficiency, along with the independence and accountability necessary to realize these goals.

Keywords: Banks and banking, Central; Federal Reserve System - Independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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