The Information Effect, Policy Rule Ambiguity, and the Decomposition of Monetary Policy Surprises
Chengcheng Jia
No 26-36, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Abstract:
I study a New Keynesian economy in which the private sector has imperfect information about both the underlying shock and the monetary policy rule. The information effect of monetary policy makes the two sources of imperfect information interact with each other. On the normative side, I show that the conventional certainty equivalence result regarding optimal monetary policy breaks down. The optimal policy rule becomes less responsive to the underlying shock, and depends on the degree of rule ambiguity. On the positive side, in a dynamic New Keynesian model calibrated to the US economy, I decompose monetary policy surprises into shock uncertainty, rule ambiguity, and the interaction effect. I find that the interaction effect accounts for more than 70 percent of the variance of monetary policy surprises.
Keywords: monetary policy; information frictions; central bank; inflation expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 E31 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2026-11-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwq:104031
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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202636
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