The boy who cried bubble: public warnings against riding bubbles
Yasushi Asako () and
Kozo Ueda
No 167, Globalization Institute Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Abstract:
Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This paper examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of periods commencing around the starting period of the bubble. If a warning involves the possibility of being issued too early, regardless of the starting period of the bubble, it cannot stop the bubble immediately. Bubble duration can be shortened by a premature public warning, but lengthened if it is late. Our model suggests that governments need to lower the probability of spurious warnings.
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D84 E58 G12 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2014-01-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Note: Published as: Asako, Yasushi and Kozo Ueda (2014), "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubbles," Economic Inquiry 52 (3): 1137-1152.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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https://www.dallasfed.org/-/media/documents/resear ... papers/2014/0167.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: THE BOY WHO CRIED BUBBLE: PUBLIC WARNINGS AGAINST RIDING BUBBLES (2014) 
Working Paper: The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubbles (2014) 
Working Paper: The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:feddgw:167
DOI: 10.24149/gwp167
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