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Dynamic Relationship Banking and the Equilibrium Cross-Section of Bank Markups

Nicolo Ceneri, Lukas Schmid, Vytautas Valaitis () and Alessandro Villa
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Vytautas Valaitis: https://www.surrey.ac.uk/people/vytautas-valaitis
Alessandro Villa: https://www.chicagofed.org/people/v/villa-alessandro

No WP 2026-23, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Abstract: Bank markups have risen substantially, dispersion across banks has increased, and large banks now charge higher markups than smaller institutions. We develop a general equilibrium model in which persistent borrower and depositor relationships endogenously generate heterogeneous bank market power. Banks are dynamic two-sided intermediaries that compete for customers while inheriting partially captive borrower and depositor bases. Relationship capital creates a trade-off between current margins and future franchise value, generating endogenous loan markups and deposit mark downs that vary across banks. Regulatory constraints and costly external equity make market power on one side of the balance sheet affect pricing on the other, linking deposit markdowns and loan markups. Quantitatively, two-sided bank market power has sizable macroeconomic implications, reducing financial intermediation and lowering aggregate output. A permanent increase in the safe rate alters franchise values, leading banks with different customer bases to adjust loan and deposit rates differently.

Keywords: bank market power; loan markups; deposit markdowns; dynamic banking platforms; financial oligopoly and oligopsony; heterogeneous banks; relationship banking; endogenous intermediation wedges; interest rate transmission; general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 E44 G12 G21 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2026-11-09
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DOI: 10.21033/wp-2026-23

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