Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve

Matthew Jaremski and David Wheelock

Review, 2025, vol. 107, issue 7, 15 pages

Abstract: The Federal Reserve Act was the outcome of compromises among competing economic and political interests. Numerous studies examine how the act came together but largely take the makeup of Congress and the administration as given rather than considering the unique circumstances that led to that political distribution. This article examines how the election of 1912 changed the makeup of Congress, which increased the likelihood of central banking legislation and shaped the act. The decision of Theodore Roosevelt and other progressives to run as third-party candidates split the Republican Party and enabled Democrats to capture the White House and Congress. We show that the election produced a less-polarized Congress and that newly elected members were more likely to vote for the act. Absent their interparty split, Republicans would likely have held the White House and Congress, and any legislation to establish a central bank almost certainly would have been quite different.

Keywords: Federal; Reserve; System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 N42 P43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve (2024)
Working Paper: Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlrv:99969

DOI: 10.20955/r.2025.07

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