International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni () and Federico Etro ()

No 2001, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union’s size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these ine?- ciencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: International Unions (2005)
Working Paper: International Unions (2005)
Working Paper: International Unions (2003)
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