An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict

Colin Jennings

Working Papers from Portsmouth University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Tullock (1971) demonstrated that the cause of politial rebellion is perhaps more to do with private expected utility that collective discontent. There is much to suggest that pecuniary motivation plays a large part in the North Irland (N.I.) conflict given the substantial amount of black market activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward an economic model in the N.I. paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue.

Keywords: WAR; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D74 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:portec:71

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