Does a Window of Opportunity Swing Open for the Knaves When the Lords Have a Skirmish?

Timofey Ginker, Konstantin Yanovsky and Sergey Zhavoronkov
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Timofey Ginker: Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Konstantin Yanovsky: Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy

Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Abstract: Notes on the Endogenous Generation of Political Competition. An attempt at a formalized description of the formation process of constitutionally limited Government when a balance of forces is preserved among the “bandits” (strongmen) competing for power. Magna Carta treaty as institution, causing (strengthening) incentive among free armed individuals to prevent strongest bandit from the treaty conditions breach and individual rights' violation, considered as a pattern of necessary preconditions' creation for system of Limited Government. The Model developed in the paper could explain some cases of endogenous arising of politically competitive system of government and Government restricting constitutional agreements. Few cases analysis – both historical and currently observed (Eastern Europe, Middle East) is provided for illustration of the Model. The implications for the attempts to establish or to support the new democracies in the countries with long lasted tradition of Bandits’ rule proposed.

Keywords: Limited government; Bandit competition; stalemate; Foreign Player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014, Revised 2014
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https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0105Yanovsky.pdf Revised version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gai:wpaper:0105

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