On the Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind

Martin Ravallion

Working Papers from Georgetown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Neither the purposive targeting of in-kind benefits nor randomized assignment is likely to yield a competitive equilibrium given private information on diverse personal gains. The paper characterizes equilibrium assignments and the implications for policy and evaluation. Using special-purpose survey data, the theory is applied to an antipoverty program providing jobs on rural public-works in a poor state of India. Large unexploited gains from trading assignments are evident. The potential gains exceed those from poverty targeting and stylized cash transfer options. Realizing the scope for poverty reduction will probably require complementary efforts to help poor people access the market for benefits-in-kind. Classification-H30, I38, O15

Keywords: Information; poverty; randomization; public-works; Bihar, India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2021-05-12
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