Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

Alexander Koch and Eloïc Peyrache ()
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Eloïc Peyrache: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts ("one-size-fits-all") can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

Keywords: Anonymous contracts; Career concerns; Incentive contracts; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Letters, 2008, Vol.100,n°3, pp.399-401. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.003⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all? (2008)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard Contracts: Does One Size Fit All? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00463445

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.003

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