Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

Nicolas Vieille () and Johannes Hörner

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Abstract: We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.

Keywords: Public offer; Private offer; lemons; market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

Published in Econometrica, 2009, Vol.77,n°1, pp.29-69

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (2009)
Working Paper: Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464577

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